Nokia strādā pie Windows 8 planšetnieka

Ievietoja:     Birkas:  , ,     Pievienots:  March 16, 2012  |  2 Comments

Nokia Lumia Coffee Tab, tā tiks dēvēts vēl ne tuvu ne iznākušais planšetnieks no tādas, domājošam cilvēkam aizmirstas, kompānijas kā Nokia. Šim te verķim tiks piešķirts 10.1″ ekrāns un darbosies tas viss uz Qualcomm ARM! procesora. Šāds solis liecina par to, ka ja arī izdosies šajā gadsimtā pabeigt pašu planšeti, tad uz Windows 8 ARM nāksies pagaidīt. Jo diezzin vai Microsoft paspēs “dzemdēt” Windows 8 priekš Intel un ARM pročiem vienlaicīgi.

P.S. Lūdzu pārstājiet lietot vārdu salikumu Latvijas Nokia, apzīmējot ar to kaut ko ļoti vēlamu.

2 Comments for Nokia strādā pie Windows 8 planšetnieka


“….pārstājiet lietot vārdu salikumu Latvijas Nokia, apzīmējot ar to kaut ko ļoti vēlamu…”
Vai varētu, LŪDZU, pakomentēt šos pēdējos vārdus? Jūtu, ka tajos ir kāda dziļa doma, tikai vēl neesmu sapratis – kāda…

(vēlams, uz e-pastu: amir_lev@inbox:disqus .lv , jo nezinu, kad vēl te ielūkošos)

Egils Zonde

Hello there,
There is a
pertinent story about a man who was working on an oil platform in the
North Sea. He woke up one night from a loud explosion, which suddenly
set his entire oil platform on fire. In mere moments, he was surrounded
by flames. Through the smoke and heat, he barely made his way out of the
chaos to the platform’s edge. When he looked down over the edge, all he
could see were the dark, cold, foreboding Atlantic waters.
the fire approached him, the man had mere seconds to react. He could
stand on the platform, and inevitably be consumed by the burning flames.
Or, he could plunge 30 meters in to the freezing waters. The man was
standing upon a “burning platform,” and he needed to make a choice.
decided to jump. It was unexpected. In ordinary circumstances, the man
would never consider plunging into icy waters. But these were not
ordinary times – his platform was on fire. The man survived the fall and
the waters. After he was rescued, he noted that a “burning platform”
caused a radical change in his behaviour.
We too, are standing on a “burning platform,” and we must decide how we are going to change our behaviour.
the past few months, I’ve shared with you what I’ve heard from our
shareholders, operators, developers, suppliers and from you. Today, I’m
going to share what I’ve learned and what I have come to believe.
I have learned that we are standing on a burning platform.
And, we have more than one explosion – we have multiple points of scorching heat that are fuelling a blazing fire around us.
example, there is intense heat coming from our competitors, more
rapidly than we ever expected. Apple disrupted the market by redefining
the smartphone and attracting developers to a closed, but very powerful
In 2008, Apple’s market share
in the $300+ price range was 25 percent; by 2010 it escalated to 61
percent. They are enjoying a tremendous growth trajectory with a 78
percent earnings growth year over year in Q4 2010. Apple demonstrated
that if designed well, consumers would buy a high-priced phone with a
great experience and developers would build applications. They changed
the game, and today, Apple owns the high-end range.
then, there is Android. In about two years, Android created a platform
that attracts application developers, service providers and hardware
manufacturers. Android came in at the high-end, they are now winning the
mid-range, and quickly they are going downstream to phones under €100.
Google has become a gravitational force, drawing much of the industry’s
innovation to its core.
Let’s not forget
about the low-end price range. In 2008, MediaTek supplied complete
reference designs for phone chipsets, which enabled manufacturers in the
Shenzhen region of China to produce phones at an unbelievable pace. By
some accounts, this ecosystem now produces more than one third of the
phones sold globally – taking share from us in emerging markets.
competitors poured flames on our market share, what happened at Nokia?
We fell behind, we missed big trends, and we lost time. At that time, we
thought we were making the right decisions; but, with the benefit of
hindsight, we now find ourselves years behind.
The first iPhone
shipped in 2007, and we still don’t have a product that is close to
their experience. Android came on the scene just over 2 years ago, and
this week they took our leadership position in smartphone volumes.
We have some brilliant
sources of innovation inside Nokia, but we are not bringing it to market
fast enough. We thought MeeGo would be a platform for winning high-end smartphones. However, at this rate, by the end of 2011, we might have only one MeeGo product in the market.
the midrange, we have Symbian. It has proven to be non-competitive in
leading markets like North America. Additionally, Symbian is proving to
be an increasingly difficult environment in which to develop to meet the
continuously expanding consumer requirements, leading to slowness in
product development and also creating a disadvantage when we seek to
take advantage of new hardware platforms. As a result, if we continue
like before, we will get further and further behind, while our
competitors advance further and further ahead.
the lower-end price range, Chinese OEMs are cranking out a device much
faster than, as one Nokia employee said only partially in jest, “the
time that it takes us to polish a PowerPoint presentation.” They are
fast, they are cheap, and they are challenging us.
the truly perplexing aspect is that we’re not even fighting with the
right weapons. We are still too often trying to approach each price
range on a device-to-device basis.
battle of devices has now become a war of ecosystems, where ecosystems
include not only the hardware and software of the device, but
developers, applications, ecommerce, advertising, search, social
applications, location-based services, unified communications and many
other things. Our competitors aren’t taking our market share with
devices; they are taking our market share with an entire ecosystem. This
means we’re going to have to decide how we either build, catalyse or
join an ecosystem.
This is one of the
decisions we need to make. In the meantime, we’ve lost market share,
we’ve lost mind share and we’ve lost time.
Tuesday, Standard & Poor’s informed that they will put our A long
term and A-1 short term ratings on negative credit watch. This is a
similar rating action to the one that Moody’s took last week. Basically
it means that during the next few weeks they will make an analysis of
Nokia, and decide on a possible credit rating downgrade. Why are these
credit agencies contemplating these changes? Because they are concerned
about our competitiveness.
preference for Nokia declined worldwide. In the UK, our brand preference
has slipped to 20 percent, which is 8 percent lower than last year.
That means only 1 out of 5 people in the UK prefer Nokia to other
brands. It’s also down in the other markets, which are traditionally our
strongholds: Russia, Germany, Indonesia, UAE, and on and on and on.
How did we get to this point? Why did we fall behind when the world around us evolved?
is what I have been trying to understand. I believe at least some of it
has been due to our attitude inside Nokia. We poured gasoline on our
own burning platform. I believe we have lacked accountability and
leadership to align and direct the company through these disruptive
times. We had a series of misses. We haven’t been delivering innovation
fast enough. We’re not collaborating internally.
Nokia, our platform is burning.
are working on a path forward — a path to rebuild our market
leadership. When we share the new strategy on February 11, it will be a
huge effort to transform our company. But, I believe that together, we
can face the challenges ahead of us. Together, we can choose to define
our future.
The burning platform, upon
which the man found himself, caused the man to shift his behaviour, and
take a bold and brave step into an uncertain future. He was able to tell
his story. Now, we have a great opportunity to do the same.